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Quantum protocols for coin flipping can be composed in series in such a way that a cheating party gains no
extra advantage from using entanglement between different rounds. This composition principle applies to
coin-flipping protocols with cheat sensitivity as well, and is used to derive two results: There are no quantum
strong coin-flipping protocols with cheat sensitivity that is linear in the bias (or bit-commitment protocols with
linear cheat detection) because these can be composed to produce strong coin flipping with arbitrarily small
bias. On the other hand, it appears that quadratic cheat detection cannot be composed in series to obtain even
weak coin flipping with arbitrarily small bias.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Coin flipping is the cryptographic problem where two mu-
tually distrustful parties try to agree on a random bit. This is
to be accomplished by sending sequential messages over a
communication channel.
The goal is that, if both players are honest and follow the
prescribed protocol, they both output the same bit, which is
uniformly random. The restriction is that, if either party is
dishonest, then the bit output by the honest player must still
be approximately random. The figure of merit for a coin-
flipping protocol is the bias, defined as the maximum in-
crease in the probabilities of the honest player’s outputs that
a cheating party can achieve.
There is a weaker version of the above problem, where
one party wants to obtain outcome zero, and the other party
outcome one. This corresponds more closely to the collo-
quial idea of coin flipping. In this case, the protocol need
only prevent a cheater from biasing the coin in favor of his
desired outcome. The two versions of the problem are
known, respectively, as strong and weak coin flipping.
In the classical setting the problem is impossible without
some additional restrictions on the computational power
available to each party. Nonetheless, in the quantum setting,
where the parties can process quantum information and com-
municate over a quantum channel, the goal can be partially
achieved.
Ambainis [1] and Spekkens and Rudolph [2] have con-
structed strong coin-flipping protocols with a bias e= 14 .
However, it was proven by Kitaev [3] (and summarized in
Ref. [4]), that all quantum protocols for strong coin flipping
must have a bias of at least e= 1˛2 −
1
2 .0.21.
Quantum weak coin flipping is a little more promising.
The best known protocol is by Spekkens and Rudolph [5]
and achieves a bias of e= 1˛2 −
1
2 . The only known bound is
due to Ambainis [1], and states that the number of rounds
must grow at least as Vslog log 1e d. In particular, to obtain
arbitrarily small bias, we must have protocols with an ever
increasing number of rounds.
Unfortunately, analyzing quantum protocols with a large
number of rounds is often difficult. One approach to obtain-
ing a weak coin-flipping protocol with arbitrarily small bias
could be to take a quantum coin-flipping protocol with a
fixed number of rounds and compose it in series with itself to
obtain a better coin-flipping protocol. It is well known that
quantum coin protocols compose well in series, and an argu-
ment for this is given in Sec. II.
Unfortunately, serially composing standard coin-flipping
protocols does not decrease the overall bias [6]. However,
quantum mechanics is good at detecting state disturbance
and other deviations from a protocol. It is therefore possible
to construct coin-flipping protocols with cheat sensitivity,
where a dishonest player may be able to cheat by a signifi-
cant amount, but only at the risk of getting caught by the
honest player. Cheat sensitive protocols can produce im-
proved coin-flipping protocols when composed in series un-
der certain conditions.
Quantum protocols with cheat sensitivity have been con-
structed by Spekkens and Rudolph [5] where players cheat-
ing by large amounts will get caught, but at least one party
can bias the coin by a small amount without being detected.
Aharonov et al. [7] have a protocol with quadratic cheat
detection on one side, but no cheat detection on the other
side. Hardy and Kent [8] devised a protocol where neither
player may cheat by any amount without risking detection,
but the functional form of the cheat detection was not deter-
mined, though it is known to be quadratic or worse. Func-
tional forms of cheat detection were also discussed in Ref.
[9].
In the present paper, we will analyze the serial composi-
tion of cheat sensitive coin-flipping protocols. We shall treat
the cheat sensitive protocols as oracles or black boxes, with a
cheat sensitivity that is given by a function of the target bias.
This will lead to our two main results.
In Sec. III we show that quadratic cheat detection proto-
cols, where the probability of getting caught is proportional
to the square of the bias, are a fixed point of serial compo-
sition, at least to leading order. This means that no matter
how many times the protocol is composed with itself, the
amount of cheat detection remains approximately the same.
Because most known cheat sensitive protocols are quadratic*Electronic address: carlosm@theory.caltech.edu
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or worse, this result is evidence that serial composition may
not be useful to obtain weak coin flipping.
In Sec. IV we show that linear cheat detection cannot
exist for strong coin flipping. This is done by composing the
linear cheat detection to obtain a strong coin-flipping proto-
col with arbitrarily small bias, in violation of Kitaev’s lower
bound. Note that the second result only uses serial composi-
tion as a tool for the proof, and the result holds for all cheat
sensitive strong coin-flipping protocols.
The result of Sec. IV also applies to bit commitment,
which is a cryptographic protocol related to coin flipping.
Coin flipping can be constructed out of bit commitment as
follows: first Alice commits a bit to Bob, then Bob an-
nounces a random bit, then Alice reveals her bit and the coin
outcome is the XOR of the two bits. Cheat detection as a
function of e can be defined in a way similar to Ref. [7]. For
Alice, e is the amount by which she can change the prob-
abilities associated with the committed bit, whereas for Bob,
e is the additional probability of guessing Alice’s committed
bit correctly. Because linear cheat detection in bit commit-
ment can be used to produce a strong coin-flipping protocol
with linear cheat detection, it is also ruled out as a possible
quantum protocol.
II. SERIAL COMPOSITION OF QUANTUM COIN
PROTOCOLS
Protocols for coin flipping can be naturally composed in
series to obtain new coin-flipping protocols. What is surpris-
ing at first is that quantum protocols for coin flipping com-
pose serially in such a way that a cheating party does not get
any unexpected advantage by using entanglement. We shall
prove this below, but let us first define carefully what we
mean by unexpected advantage.
Let P be any quantum coin-flipping protocol. At the end
of the protocol each player will output one of h0,1 ,Cj where
the last entry denotes the output when one player catches the
other player cheating. Let us assume that Alice is honest and
Bob is cheating. For each cheating strategy employed by
Bob, there will be a triple of probabilities sP0 , P1 , PCd, one
for each of Alice’s possible outputs. Let VAsPd be the set of
all such attainable triples. Clearly s1/2 ,1 /2 ,0dPVAsPd
since Bob can always play honestly. If the protocol does not
allow Bob to fully bias toward 1 then s0,1 ,0d„VAsPd.
Some protocols may not have any cheat detection, in which
case PC will always be zero. For honest Bob and cheating
Alice there is a similarly defined VBsPd.
Assume we take the protocol P and run it many times in
series. We are interested in proving that a cheating player,
say Bob, does not obtain any extra cheating power by using
entanglement between different rounds. That is, that for ev-
ery round j, independently of previous outcomes and strate-
gies used by Bob, any strategy that Bob employs will make
Alice output based on a triple of probabilities in VAsPd.
Clearly Bob can vary his strategy in each coin-flip round,
and even base his strategy on the outcomes of the previous
coin flips. However, when flipping N coins in series, Bob
cannot obtain an outcome of all ones with a probability
greater than sP1,maxdN, where P1,max is the maximum value of
P1 over any triple in VAsPd.
The reason that quantum coin flipping can be serially
composed stems from the following conditions which are
always imposed on coin-flipping protocols.
(1) There is always at least one honest party.
(2) The details of the protocol, which can be described in
terms of fixed unitaries acting on a fixed initial state, are
known to all parties.
(3) The protocol begins in an unentangled state, a condi-
tion which can be enforced by the honest party.
The first condition arises because no constraint is imposed on
the case when both parties are cheating, and therefore the
case never needs consideration. The third condition is always
imposed to avoid trivial protocols, since establishing corre-
lations is the goal of a coin-flipping procedure.
The proof of composition is fairly simple. At the begin-
ning of the kth round, the cheater will be unentangled from
the honest player. The honest player has erased her Hilbert
space and reset it to the initial state of the protocol. All that
the cheating player has left over from the previous rounds is
some quantum state in his Hilbert space. However, because
the honest protocol is public, the cheating player knows ex-
actly the state of his Hilbert space (which may be a mixed
state, caused by the honest player erasing her Hilbert space).
Now assume that he could, with the help of this state,
force the honest player (say Alice) to output with probabili-
ties not in VAsPd. Then with the same state, he could obtain
the same results in the first round or even when protocol P is
used in a one-shot run, contradicting the definition of VAsPd.
To put it another way, Bob can simulate in his private Hilbert
space the first k−1 rounds and start playing the first round
from that point, but this clearly can give him no extra advan-
tage.
The conclusion of this section is that, given a quantum
protocol for coin flipping, we may treat the protocol as a
black box when composing it in series with itself (or even
with other coin-flipping protocols) without worrying about
entanglement between rounds. We shall use this fact to de-
rive two interesting results.
III. QUADRATIC CHEAT DETECTION IS A FIXED POINT
OF COIN FLIPPING
Because quantum coin flipping composes in series, it is
tempting to try to use a classical game layer on top of a
known quantum coin-flipping protocol in order to reduce its
maximum bias. That is, we wish to construct a two player
classical game that uses the quantum coin as a black box.
The game could be, for instance, flipping a coin N times, and
the party that wins a majority of coin tosses wins the game.
The ideal goal for this process would be to produce a
weak coin-flipping protocol with arbitrarily small bias. While
it is known that games built out of standard coin-flipping
protocols can never reduce the maximum bias, the situation
is different when cheat detection is available. Especially in
the case of weak coin flipping, where an honest player may
declare himself the winner if he detects the other party cheat-
ing, there are certain black-box protocols that can be used to
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produce arbitrarily small bias. The question is how much
cheat detection is needed in order for successive composi-
tions to improve a coin-flipping protocol?
We will be interested in protocols with symmetric, mono-
mial cheat detection. Let P be a protocol where both parties
have equal cheating opportunities (VAsPd=VBsPd;VsPd)
and such that all probabilities sP0 , P1 , PCdPVsPd have the
form
P0 = s1 − PCdS12 + eD , s1d
P1 = s1 − PCdS12 − eD , s2d
PC ø aueub, s3d
which can be viewed as a function of a parameter e that is
controlled by the cheating party. The constants a.0 and b
ø0 denote the amount of cheat detection. Strictly speaking,
PC should also be considered a second parameter that can be
controlled by the cheater, as he can always use a less optimal
cheating strategy. In practice, a cheater will always minimize
PC for a given bias, and therefore we may assume equality in
Eq. (3). We shall call the case b=1 linear cheat detection,
and the case b=2 quadratic cheat detection.
When building games out of cheat sensitive coin flips, the
outcome of the entire game will be “cheating” if in any in-
dividual coin flip a cheating outcome was obtained. To lead-
ing order in epsilon, the composite game will have a cheat
sensitivity of the same form, with the same coefficient b, but
in general a different a. When b is small, successive compo-
sitions increase a thereby producing a more cheat sensitive
protocol, whereas in the large b regime composition has the
opposite effect. We intend to prove in this section that b=2 is
a fixed point of coin flipping. That is, for all possible games
that use a coin with quadratic cheat detection as a black box,
the resulting protocol has exactly the same amount of cheat
detection to leading order in epsilon.
We begin by describing the set of all possible games that
employ a cheat sensitive coin flip as a black box. These can
be put in correspondence with the set of binary trees, where
the leaf nodes are labeled by either zero or one. For instance,
the tree corresponding to the “Best two out of three” game is
depicted in Fig. 1. Each binary node corresponds to a coin
flip, with up corresponding to the outcome zero and down to
the outcome one. The leaves are end points of the game and
their labels correspond to the final game outcome at that
node.
Other examples of games that produce coin flips include
“first outcome that is repeated N times” and “first outcome to
occur a total of N times more than the other,” both of which
correspond to trees of infinite length. Allowing for trees of
infinite length also accounts for all games that have a tie
outcome, after which the game is restarted. For trees of infi-
nite length we impose the additional constraint that when
playing honestly, the probability of never reaching a leaf
node is zero.
Let x be a variable that ranges over the binary nodes of
the tree. A general cheating strategy is a function esxd, which
assigns a bias to each node where a coin flip takes place. We
also define pesxd as the probability of arriving at node x
given a cheating strategy esxd. In defining this quantity, we
assume that if the cheater is caught at a given node, the game
stops, thereby reducing the probability of arriving at the
child nodes. In terms of these quantities we can write the
total probability of getting caught:
PC,tot = o
x
apesxduesxdub. s4d
To leading order in esxd, we can replace pesxd with the prob-
ability of arriving at the node in the honest protocol. This can
be written as 2−Dsxd where Dsxd is the depth of the node x,
with the root node having depth zero. The formula becomes
PC,tot = o
x
a2−Dsxduesxdub. s5d
To expand the total bias to leading order in epsilon, we
only need to keep track of terms that are linear in esxd, and
can therefore disregard the multiplicative factor 1− PC in the
probabilities for obtaining zero or one. Of course, we are
assuming b.1 at this point, and will soon concentrate on
b=2. The probability of the cheater obtaining his desired
outcome, and winning the game, satisfies a simple recursion
relation:
PWsxd =
1
2
fPWsx↑d + PWsx↓dg + esxdfPWsx↑d − PWsx↓dg ,
s6d
where PWsxd is the probability of winning having arrived at
node x, and x↑, x↓ are the two children of node x. At the root
node the probability of winning is
PW,tot =
1
2
+ o
x
2−DsxdDsxdesxd , s7d
where Dsxd= PWsx↑d− PWsx↓d, which can be computed at this
point from the honest probability of winning.
The total bias for the game is given to leading order by
uetotu= PW−1/2, where we have excluded cases where the
cheating benefits the honest player. For a given total bias, the
cheater will choose esxd to minimize the probability of get-
FIG. 1. “Best two out of three” game tree. Binary nodes are
labeled by the probability of winning for an honest player trying to
obtain outcome 0.
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ting caught. The calculation to minimize PC,tot under the con-
straint of fixed etot can easily be done using a Lagrange mul-
tiplier to obtain the result:
esxd = sgnflDsxdgUlDsxd
ab U
1/sb−1d
, s8d
where l is the Lagrange multiplier. We have allowed esxd to
range over the reals, but will show below that for quadratic
cheat detection the optimal solution satisfies the requirement
uesxduł1/2.
To eliminate the Lagrange multiplier, we can substitute
the expression for etot into the expression for PC,tot to obtain
PC,tot = anewuetotub, s9d
where
anew = aSo
x
2−DsxduDsxdub/sb−1dD1−b. s10d
For the case b=2, the following lemma shows that anew
=a for all game trees:
Lemma: For all game trees as described above, we have
the equality
o
x
2−DsxdDsxd2 = 1. s11d
The lemma can be proven using a simple combinatorial ar-
gument that is presented for the interested reader in the Ap-
pendix.
From Eq. (8) we see that for b=2, the amount of cheating
at node x is proportional to Dsxd. The constant of proportion-
ality, as well as the Lagrange multiplier, are fixed by Eq. (7).
After eliminating a factor of 1 using the above lemma we
obtain that the optimal strategy is esxd= uetotuDsxd. This satis-
fies the intuition that the cheater will choose a larger bias on
coin flips that are more consequential. Furthermore, because
uDsxduł1, we have shown that the optimal strategy is
achievable (i.e., uesxduł1/2 for every x) whenever uetotu
ł1/2.
For other values of b near 2, we can consider the deriva-
tive of anew with respect to b. For any fixed graph, this de-
rivative is negative. The conclusion is that for every graph,
serial composition of b,2 cheat detection leads to improve-
ment to lowest order, whereas in the b.2 case the cheat
sensitivity worsens.
The above results complete our argument that quadratic
cheat detection is a fixed point for coin flipping. The argu-
ment is only valid in the regime where all biases, including
the total bias, are small. Unfortunately, because a protocol
producing weak coin flipping with arbitrarily small bias
would have to employ arbitrarily large trees, it is not suffi-
cient to simply take the small bias limit on a fixed tree.
In essence, associated with each weak coin-flipping pro-
tocol there is a function PCsed indicating the minimum prob-
ability with which a party will get caught cheating if they try
to bias the coin by e. Composing this protocol in series one
obtains a new protocol with function PC,totsetotd. That is, se-
rial composition with a given game tree induces a map from
the set of functions PCsed to itself. We have shown that,
independent of the tree, if the original function behaves as
ae2 for small e, then so will its image.
The fact that the coefficient of the quadratic term remains
fixed under the map induced by every game tree is a peculiar
and interesting feature. It is indicative that serial composition
of quadratic cheat detection may not be useful for producing
weak coin flipping with arbitrarily small bias. However, fur-
ther research in this direction is needed in order to conclu-
sively settle the issue.
IV. NO-GO THEOREM FOR LINEAR CHEAT DETECTION
In this section we shall switch gears and focus on serial
composition of linear cheat detection protocols. We shall
prove that linear cheat detection can be serially composed to
produce not only weak coin flipping but also strong coin
flipping with arbitrarily small bias. Because of Kitaev’s
bound (discussed in Ref. [4]), the result in this section proves
that a strong coin-flipping protocol with linear cheat detec-
tion cannot exist.
The result of this section only applies to strong coin-
flipping schemes with cheat sensitivity as described in Eq.
(3). An alternative not covered by the proof in this section is
the case where Alice can force outcome 1 (and Bob can force
outcome 0) without getting caught, which corresponds to
cheat sensitive weak coin flipping. Because weak cheat sen-
sitivity can be simulated by strong cheat sensitivity, the result
of the previous section applies to weak cheat sensitivity as
well. However, the opposite is not true, and the results of the
present section do not apply to linear cheat sensitivity in
weak coin flipping.
Since strong coin flipping can be constructed out of bit
commitment, the result of this section can also be applied to
cheat sensitive bit-commitment protocols. In fact, the only
known coin-flipping protocol, where neither side can cheat
by a finite amount without getting caught, is described in
Ref. [8], and is a strong coin-flipping protocol that is con-
structed out of bit commitment.
For the proof of the above statements, we assume the
existence of a quantum protocol P described by Eq. (3) with
b=1 and some nonzero a. We shall describe a game that uses
P as a black box, which achieves strong coin flipping with
bias that becomes arbitrarily small in the limit of a game
parameter N→‘. Though, for the purposes of comparing
against Kitaev’s bound, it is sufficient to allow honest play-
ers to output “cheat” at the end, we will construct the game
so that the honest player always outputs one of the outcomes
zero or one.
The game is the random walk on a one-dimensional line,
starting from the origin, using the coin provided by P. The
game ends with the first arrival at one of the two sites ±N,
with the right end corresponding to the outcome zero, and
the left end to one.
If one party detects cheating, they will continue the game
using a private fair coin, and output according to the out-
come of the game. Let zP h−N , . . . ,Nj be a variable that runs
along the line. If cheating occurs when the game is at z, then
the honest players can simply output using P0= sN+zd /2N
and P1= sN−zd /2N. In essence, the only deterrent to the
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cheater is that he may be able to cheat more effectively in a
future round. Note that the honest party cannot just flip a
balanced coin after detecting cheating because in this case
the cheating party would only cheat when he is about to lose.
Because the honest player keeps no state beyond the cur-
rent location along the line, z, there is an optimal cheating
strategy where the bias only depends on z. That is, we only
need to consider functions eszd when maximizing over cheat-
ing strategies.
We assume that the cheating player is trying to bias to-
ward zero (i.e., the right side). We can then define the func-
tion Weszd to be the probability of winning starting from
node z, using biases eszd. The function is similar to PW de-
fined in the previous section, except that we are now using
large biases, which cannot be ignored in calculating the prob-
ability of winning.
The function has the constraints WesNd=1, Wes−Nd=0
and
Weszd = P0feszdgWsz + 1d + P1feszdgWsz − 1d
+ PCfeszdg
N + z
2N
. s12d
Clearly, for optimal strategies, Weszdø sN+zd /2N for all z
because the cheating party can always play honestly.
The value of Wes0d is simply the probability of winning
the entire game. The cheater will chose eszd in order to maxi-
mize Wes0d. We shall prove that maxfWes0d−1/2g→0 as
N→‘.
The analysis is made easier by using a modified black box
protocol P8 with achievable probabilities of the form
P0 =
1
2
+ e , s13d
P1 =
1
2
− s1 + ade , s14d
PC = ae , s15d
for 0łełemax where emax=1/ s2+2ad. For every e, protocol
P8 gives the cheater a slightly higher probability of obtaining
the desired outcome than with protocol P. Therefore, any
bounds on cheating obtained using P8 as a black box will
apply when using P instead.
Consider using P8 and varying independently each of the
nodes of the complete game tree. The bias esxd of each node
enters linearly into Wes0d, which can be maximized by let-
ting the biases take only the boundary values of 0 or emax. As
discussed above, the optimal biases will depend only on the
corresponding value of z, and therefore we need only con-
sider functions eszd which take values in h0,emaxj.
The maximization is now easy to analyze. Define dszd
=Weszd− sN+zd /2N, which is the extra probability of win-
ning that the cheater is getting at position z. We shall prove
below that
dsz + 1d ł
2 + a
2aN
Þ dszd ł
2 + a
2aN
. s16d
If eszd=emax the above statement is true because Eq. (12)
states that
dszd = S12 + emaxDSdsz + 1d + 12ND
=
2 + a
2 + 2aSdsz + 1d − 2 + a2aN D + 2 + a2aN . s17d
On the other hand, if eszd=0 then Eq. (12) states that
dsz + 1d − dszd = dszd − dsz − 1d , s18d
that is, d has a constant slope around z. If for all z8,z we
have esz8d=0, then the slope must be constant through this
entire region. Since ds−Nd=0, the slope can only be negative
(i.e., increasing toward the left) if dszd,0, which proves Eq.
(16) for this case. Otherwise, let z8,z be the largest integer
such that esz8d=emax. Again the slope must be constant from
z8, in which case, by Eq. (18) the slope can only be negative
if dsz8d, s2+ad /2aN which implies dszd, s2+ad /2aN.
Having proven Eq. (16), and using the initial case dsNd
=0, we have shown
etot ; Wes0d −
1
2
= ds0d ł
2 + a
2aN
, s19d
which can be made arbitrarily small by taking the limit N
→‘.
The game described in this section shows that a strong
coin-flipping protocol with linear cheat detection can be se-
rially composed to obtain a strong coin-flipping protocol
with arbitrarily small bias. The conclusion is that quantum
strong coin-flipping protocols with linear cheat detection
cannot exist.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Using serial composition of coin flipping we have estab-
lished an upper bound on the amount of cheat detection pos-
sible in quantum protocols for coin flipping and bit commit-
ment. We have also presented evidence that serially
composing quadratic cheat sensitive protocols does not lead
to an improvement in the amount of cheat detection. We
speculate that quadratic or worse cheat sensitivity sbø2d
cannot be composed in series to obtain weak coin flipping
with arbitrarily small bias. We also speculate that cheat de-
tection better than quadratic sb,2d does not exist for bit
commitment or strong coin flipping, and probably not for
weak coin flipping either.
Nevertheless, linear cheat detection in weak coin flipping
remains an open, though unlikely, possibility. In fact, by se-
rially composing weak coin flipping with linear cheat detec-
tion, it is not hard to show that one can construct a weak
coin-flipping protocol with a bias of exactly zero. The appar-
ent contradiction with the result of Lo and Chau [10] is re-
solved by noting that they only considered protocols with a
fixed number of rounds. However, there are protocols where
the number of rounds is variable and possibly arbitrarily
large (a good classical example is rock-paper-scissors), while
still having a zero probability of going on forever. For these
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protocols the measurements cannot be delayed to the final
round, and therefore the analysis of Lo and Chau does not
apply. These protocols can always be truncated to a finite
number of rounds, though, at the cost of allowing an arbi-
trarily small bias.
Other questions that remain open include: What happens
to serial composition of quadratic cheat detection in the large
bias regime? What can be said for other functional forms of
cheat detection versus bias, including cases where one party
may be a able to cheat by a small amount without getting
caught? And of course, the main question—whether or not
weak coin flipping with arbitrarily small bias can be
achieved as a quantum protocol—remains unresolved.
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APPENDIX: PROOF OF LEMMA
Let T be a binary tree. We will use the variable x to denote
a binary node of T and y to denote a leaf.
Associated with T there is a function PWsyd on the leaf
nodes which takes the values zero or one. The function can
be extended to the rest of the nodes by defining PWsxd as the
average of the function on its two descendants. In terms of
coins, PW is simply the probability of winning when playing
honestly starting from the given node. The function corre-
sponds to the coin outcomes on the leaf nodes if the goal is
to obtain 1, and otherwise the coin outcome is 1− PWsyd. To
obtain a fair coin toss, we require that PW equal 1 /2 on the
root node. Otherwise, the function and the tree are arbitrary.
We also arbitrarily label the two outgoing edges from
each binary node as up and down, and define Dsxd= PWsx↑d
− PWsx↓d. Finally, let Dsxd be the depth of node x, with the
root node having depth zero.
Lemma: Given a tree T and function PW as described
above, the following equality holds:
o
x
2−DsxdDsxd2 = 1. sA1d
Proof. Dsxd is a linear combination of PWsxd on its descen-
dants, which in turn is a linear combination of PWsyd on the
leaf nodes. Therefore the left-hand side of the above equation
is a quadratic polynomial of PWsyd.
Fix a leaf node y. The function PWsyd only appears in
Dsxd if y is a descendant of x, in which case it has a coeffi-
cient of ±2Dsxd+1−Dsyd. The coefficient of PWsyd2 in this poly-
nomial is therefore given by
o
i=0
Dsyd−1
2−i22fi+1−Dsydg = 22f1−Dsydgs2Dsyd − 1d . sA2d
Fix a second leaf node y8Þy. Let x8 be the unique node that
has y as a descendant along one branch and y8 along the
other. The coefficient of PWsydPWsy8d is
2F o
i=0
Dsx8d−1
2−i+2si+1d−Dsyd−Dsy8dG − 2Dsx8d−Dsyd−Dsy8d+3
= − 23−Dsyd−Dsy8d, sA3d
where the only negative term is contributed by Dsx8d. Note
the extra factor of 2 accounting for the double occurrence of
PWsydPWsy8d.
Combining these results, the left-hand side of Eq. (A1) is
4o
y
2−DsydPWsyd2 − 4Fo
y
2−DsydPWsydG2. sA4d
Note that the factor in brackets is just PW at the root node,
which must equal 1 /2. The left summand can be simplified
by using PWsyd2= PWsyd, in which case it can also be written
in terms of PW at the root node. We have shown that
the left-hand side equals 4s1/2d−4s1/2d2=1 as desired.h
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